Michael Tomasello even though evolutionary biologists and comparative psychologists interested in culture have been primarily concerned with seemingly straightforward processes of social learning and other forms of nongenetic informaCulture has traditionally been attributed only to human beings. tion transfer among members of social groups. The Despite growing evidence of behavioral diversity in wild chimmain problem is that the different disciplines involved panzee populations, most anthropologists and psychologists still approach the problem of culture with different sets of deny culture to this animal species. We argue here that culture is not monolithic but a set of processes. These processes show concerns. The basic dichotomy is between biological much diversity both in the social norms and models that deterapproaches, in which all information that is transmitmine which individuals will be exposed to particular cultural ted nongenetically among members of a group is of invariants and what cultural variants will be present in the populaterest (e.g., Bonner 1980, Boyd and Richerson 1985, tion and in the social learning mechanisms that determine the Dawkins 1976, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1983, Mun- fidelity of transmission of the variants over time. Recognition of the diversity of these processes is important because it affects dinger 1980), and more psychological approaches, in cultural dissemination, cultural evolution, and the complexity of which the main concern is the cognitive and learning cultural artifacts. A comparison of chimpanzee and human culmechanisms by means of which such information is tures shows many deep similarities, thus suggesting that they transmitted (e.g., Galef 1992 Galef , 1996 ; Tomasello 1990, share evolutionary roots. Two possible differences between the two species are discussed. First, thanks to indirect means of 1996).
transmission such as language, cultural dissemination is possible These two approaches may be illustrated with the over greater stretches of time and space in humans than in chimwell-known case of the potato washing of a group of Jappanzees. Second, human cultures rely more intensively than anese macaques (Kawamura 1959 , Kawai 1965 . A chimpanzee cultures on cumulative cultural evolution through young female of this species discovered a new and usethe ratchet effect, which allows the accumulation of modifications over time and produces more elaborate cultural artifacts.
ful food-processing technique with human-provisioned potatoes that had become sandy, and this behavior christophe boesch is Director of the Max Planck Institute for spread quickly-at least in the context of evolutionary Evolutionary Anthropology (Inselstrasse 22-26, 04103 Leipzig, time-to other group members, possibly as they imiGermany). Born in 1951, he was educated at the University of tated one another's behavior. The researchers docu- Geneva (Diplom, 1975) and the University of Zü rich (Ph.D., mented in meticulous detail which individuals ac-that the spread of the behavior was relatively slow, with cies. We proceed to show that in general within one population there are many possible social conditions an average time of over two years for acquisition by the members of the group that learned it (approximately and lines of dissemination through which individuals may be exposed to particular behavioral practices half)-which would not seem consistent with a process of imitation (typically assumed to be more rapid). More-within communities. We then show that there are many different types of social learning processes by over, the rate of spread did not increase with the number of users as would be expected under the imitation means of which individuals may acquire these behavioral practices, and these different learning processes hypothesis as more demonstrators became available for observation across time (but see Lefebvre 1995 and our lead to cultural traditions with different properties over time. In this context we introduce some recent research models below). Galef also noted that after a certain period many youngsters grew up following their mothers on the social learning of captive chimpanzees. We conclude with an explicit comparison of chimpanzee and into the water and finding potatoes there, an excellent opportunity for individual learning and discovery, and, human cultures.
It is perhaps of special note that in the past the two indeed, Visalberghi and Fragaszy (1990) found that other macaques could learn this behavior on their own quite of us have been somewhat at odds on the question of chimpanzee culture and its relation to human culture rapidly if provided with sandy fruits and bowls of water. The point is that in Galef's interpretation the spread of (e.g., see Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner 1993 and Boesch 1993 , 1996a . This paper represents our atthe behavior was due not to imitation but rather to each individual's ''reinventing the wheel,'' with the behavior tempt to reconcile at least some of our theoretical differences and to locate more precisely the differences of those who had already acquired it creating propitious learning conditions for those who followed. The trans-that remain in an attempt to guide future research on the question of chimpanzee culture toward the most mission process in this case would thus seem to be somewhat different from that involved in at least some pressing and important theoretical issues. human cultural traditions, which have been shown to rely mainly on individuals' imitating one another's behavior or behavioral strategy (e.g., language).
Population-Specific Behaviors
In this paper our focus is on chimpanzee culture and cultural transmission, with an eye to both similarities in Chimpanzees to and differences from the human case. We focus on the chimpanzee because, of all the 180ϩ species of pri-Humans and chimpanzees, along with many other animal species, acquire their behavior via processes of gemate, it is clearly the most interesting from a cultural point of view. To a degree unknown in any other species netic transmission, individual learning, and social learning, with the precise contribution of each of these of nonhuman animal, primate or otherwise, different populations of chimpanzees seem to have their own sources of information differing for different behaviors.
As a means of information transfer, genetic transmisunique behavioral repertoires, including such things as food preferences, tool use, gestural signals, and other be-sion occurs once per reproductive event and produces relatively inflexible behavior-and it produces this behaviors, and these group differences often persist across generations (see McGrew 1992; Boesch 1996a, b , and havior according to the Mendelian rules of inheritance in the descendants of one individual (Ridley 1996) . Indithe papers in Wrangham et al. 1994 for recent reviews). From the biological point of view, there is no question vidual learning can occur more rapidly than genetic transmission, as each individual may learn many new that much of chimpanzee behavior is culturally transmitted in the sense that individuals consistently ac-behaviors during its lifetime. Population-specific behaviors based on individual learning have been observed quire behaviors specific to their population in ways that do not depend directly on genetic transmission or upon in a wide variety of animals where individuals adapt to their local physical environments. This kind of individobvious ecological conditions (e.g., Boesch 1996a, b) . From the psychological point of view, however, it is ual learning influenced by local ecology-and thus leading in some cases to population differences in behavpossible that in some cases the population-specific behavioral traditions of chimpanzees are due to each indi-ior-is generally not considered cultural transmission because the social environment is not involved. Galef vidual's adapting individually to its own local environment-eating only the foods that are locally available, (1992) has called it ''environmental shaping.'' Social learning and the resulting cultural transmission may to give a mundane example-with the social environment playing a minor role in the acquisition process also occur independent of reproductive events and more than once in a lifetime. Social learning may sometimes (Tomasello 1990 (Tomasello , 1994 , whereas in other cases one of several processes of social learning and imitation may be even more rapid than individual learning, because individuals may learn by observing others. be at work.
Our central theoretical point in this paper is that culFor current purposes we may posit that the naturally occurring behaviors of a primate group may be assumed ture is not monolithic. We begin with an evolutionary perspective on patterns of cultural behavior in different to be cultural (i.e., due primarily to social learning) when (1) two groups of the same species differ in a bechimpanzee communities in the wild, detailing some of the population-specific behaviors known in this spe-havior (with a countable number in each group con-bo es ch an d tom a se ll o Chimpanzee and Human Cultures 593 forming), (2) there are no obvious differences in the en-populations because it is only in these cases that we can know the whole repertoire of a population. Published vironments of the two groups, making an explanation in terms of individual learning (environmental shaping) material on all tool uses and other behaviors is available only for the chimpanzees of Bossou, Gombe, Mahale, unlikely, and (3) there are no genetic differences between individuals that acquire the behavior and those and Taï. The difference between four thoroughly studied chimpanzee populations and, for example, some 650 that do not.
A description of some population-specific behaviors distinctive human societies used for a study of war (Wright 1942 ) is a measure of how little we know about found in wild chimpanzees will illustrate the range of cultural potentialities demonstrated by these animals our closest living relative. Also not listed in table 1 are all the population-specific behaviors for which a clear and serve as a base for our discussion on the social aspects of cultural transmission. The list in table 1 is not ecological explanation could be provided to explain the irregular distribution within the species. A comparison exhaustive; we have limited it to the longest-studied with figure 1, which shows the geographical distribution of those populations throughout Africa, gives an idea of the variation in the distribution of the behaviors. t abl e 1 at Gombe (McGrew 1974 (McGrew , 1979 . Termite fishing at
Gombe was also predominantly a female activity but Body-oriented has been reported in all adults of the Kasakela commu-
nity (McGrew 1977 (McGrew , 1979 As we have mentioned, ecological differences in the zawa and Yamakoshi (1996); Taï, Boesch and Boesch (1990), Boesch (1993, environment inhabited by different chimpanzee popula- Goodall (1986 ), McGrew (1992 , 1994 ; Mahale, Nishida tions may in some cases be a direct explanation for the (1973 ( , 1987 ( ), McGrew (1992 ; Assirik (Senegal), McGrew, Baldwin, and Tutin (1979) ; Kibale (Uganda), Wrangham and Isabirye-Busata, cited in variations we observe between them. For example, in McGrew (1992) .
West Africa, the chimpanzees of Mont Nimba (Cô te note: ϩ, population in which the behavior has been observed; (Ϫ), populad'lvoire) were observed to bang hard-shelled Strychnos tion in which the behavior is absent but this is easily explained by the abfruit against tree trunks to open them as do the chimsence of the resource; Ϫ, population in which the behavior is absent and cannot be explained by simple ecological differences.
panzees at Taï and Gombe, whereas their direct neigh-bors, the chimpanzees of Bossou (Liberia), have never ants have swarmed about 10 cm up the tool they withdraw it, twist the hand holding it, and directly sweep been seen to do so because the Strychnos fruits are not available there (Matsuzawa and Yamakoshi 1996) . Simi-off the ants with the lips. Taï chimpanzees use sticks 30 cm long on average and perform the dipping movement larly, Taï chimpanzees often crack coula and panda nuts, whereas chimpanzees in Gombe, Bossou, and Ma-about 12 times per minute, taking an average of 15 ants at a time. Gombe chimpanzees hold the stick with one hale have never been observed to do so (Boesch and Boesch 1990, Goodall 1986) . As the two species of nuts hand among the same species of soldier ants guarding the nest entrance and, once they have swarmed about do not occur at Gombe and Mahale, the explanation for the behavior's absence is obvious. Such an explanation halfway up the tool, withdraw the stick and sweep it through the closed fingers of the free hand; the mass of applies to only a few of the behaviors listed in table 1, however. For example, extracting bone marrow from insects is then rapidly transferred to the mouth. Gombe tools are on average 66 cm long (range 15-113 cm), and prey eaten with a stick has been observed only at Taï and is absent at Gombe, Kibale, and Mahale, where the dipping is performed 2.6 times per minute. Thus, of the two techniques used to dip for ants one is clearly chimpanzees regularly eat the same species of prey (red colobus monkey). However, Bossou and Assirik chim-more efficient (Taï, 180 ants/min.; Gombe, 760 ants/ min.). Nevertheless, all the chimpanzees belonging to a panzees have never been seen to eat monkeys, and the absence of marrow picking there can be explained by population were seen to use one and the same technique. this observation.
For nut cracking the situation is complicated by the Leaf clipping was first described in the Mahale chimpanzees in Tanzania, as follows: ''A chimpanzee picks fact that besides populations that do not crack nuts because these are absent we know of many populations one to five stiff leaves, grasps the petiole between the thumb and the index finger, repeatedly pulls it from living within the distribution range of the two nut species that do not crack them. This is true for chimpan-side to side while removing the leaf blade with the incisors, and thus bites the leaf to pieces. In removing the zees in the forests of Gabon (Tutin and Fernandez 1984) , Cameroon (Sugiyama 1990) , and Ghana and central and leaf blades, a ripping sound is conspicuously and distinctly produced. When only the midrib with tiny western Cô te d'lvoire (Boesch et al. 1994) . A closer analysis of nut cracking in Cô te d'Ivoire revealed that the pieces of the leaf blade remains, it is dropped and another sequence of ripping a new leaf is often repeated'' Sassandra-N'Zo River is the boundary of the behavior: chimpanzees on the east side do not crack nuts, (Nishida 1987:466) . None of the leaf is eaten. Leaf clipping has also been observed regularly at Bossou (Sugiwhereas chimpanzees on the west do. Some populations on the two sides of the river are only 30-50 km apart, yama 1981) and Taï (Boesch 1995 (Boesch , 1996a but only twice at Gombe (Jane Goodall, personal communicaand the most relevant ecological factors affecting nut cracking, such as availability of nuts and tools, as well tion, cited in Nishida 1987). The function of this behavior differs between populations and seems arbitrary. At as the density of chimpanzees, can be excluded as explaining this difference (Boesch et al. 1994) .
Mahale, chimpanzees perform it most commonly as a herding/courtship behavior in sexual contexts (23 of 41 For most behaviors classified as foraging behavior it can be argued that subtle ecological differences or differ-observations [Nishida 1987]) : young adult males and adult estrous females apparently performed it to attract ences that existed in the past may be the source of population differences (Tomasello 1990) . The problem is that the attention of group members of the opposite sex (M.
Huffman, personal communication). At Bossou it has this argument is almost impossible to disprove. However, for communicative and body-oriented behaviors been observed mostly in apparent frustration or in play (41 of 44 observations [Sugiyama 1981 and personal (e.g., leaf clipping) such argumentation applies much less easily, as a branch or a leaf is the most that is re-communication]). During the habituation period individuals surprised in trees might leaf clip while watching quired for behaviors using an object (10 of the 13 listed in table 1). These behaviors are thus only marginally de-the human observer. Once the habituation was more complete, this form of leaf clipping disappeared, and it pendent upon ecological constraints and much more influenced by social factors. At first glance they seem to is now observed in youngsters only as a form of play. At
Taï it is in the first place a behavior performed by adult be the best candidates for cultural behaviors in chimpanzees.
males before drumming (249 out of 321 observations [Boesch 1995]) ; here the situation is complicated by the Population-specificity is more complicated than it first appears, since some behaviors present in many fact that during the first ten years of the study all and only adult males leaf clipped just before drumming (129 populations have been shown to differ in form or function (Boesch 1996a, b) . Two behaviors, ant dipping and out of 132 observations) but in late December 1990 the behavior suddenly began to be performed also by memleaf clipping, are especially instructive in this respect. Ant dipping has been observed in four populations (ta-bers of all age/sex classes and while resting (32 out of 183 observations). This evolution in the context of perble 1); however, two different techniques of dipping for ants have been observed (Boesch and Boesch 1990, formance of a behavior took place within a month and affected all 6 adult males and 11 other group members McGrew 1974). At Taï, chimpanzees hold the stick with one hand and dip it among the soldier ants (Dory-(Boesch 1995) .
Analogous to the arbitrary variation in the context of lus nigricans) guarding the nest entrance. When the bo es ch an d tom a se ll o Chimpanzee and Human Cultures 595 leaf clipping in three chimpanzee populations, similar ralistic approach to understanding how qualitatively different social constraints affect the diffusion and functions may be fulfilled by different behaviors in different chimpanzee populations (Boesch 1996a, b) . Sex-transformation of cultural variants within a population and therefore produce different cultural systems. ual courtship by male chimpanzees in all known populations is generally done by shaking a sapling while Cultural-variant acquisition is rarely if ever a free choice among numerous options; there are always conshowing the erect penis to the estrous female. Younger males at Mahale may attract the attention of estrous fe-straints. These constraints not only determine what will be acquired but also limit the possible modificamales by leaf clipping, which is less conspicuous than the usual sapling waving. At Taï, males that may want tions of the cultural variants throughout their existence. For example, in the potato washing of Japanese to be inconspicuous knock branches or tree trunks with their knuckles to attract the attention of an estrous fe-macaques, the inventor, Imo, associated primarily with members of her maternal line, and members of other male. Similarly, chimpanzees may squash ectoparasites that they intend to eat. At Gombe chimpanzees were lines were therefore not in a position to copy her. Two distinct kinds of social constraints can be identified. observed to place ectoparasites they found while grooming another individual or themselves on leaves and then The first determines the array of cultural variants available in the group among which a naive individual may squash them with their thumbs before eating them (this behavior is called leaf grooming in table 1 [Goodall choose. We shall call this the social norm. The second identifies the social model that naive individuals will 1986, Boesch 1995]). At Taï chimpanzees place the ectoparasites on their forearms and squash them by tapping have available to learn from in particular cases and therefore determines which variants will be acquired. them with the tip of the index finger of the other hand [Boesch 1996b]) . Leaf grooming was never seen at Taï, nor was index hitting at Gombe. Here again the group the social norm seems to decide which behavior will be used to fulfill a given function, and this choice seems arbitrary.
Choice of cultural variants is directly affected by what members of the group can observe. At this level, one of In conclusion, population-specific behaviors in wild chimpanzee populations have been observed in differ-three groupwide conditions may prevail: free choice, convention, and imposition. ent contexts, and this includes not only behaviors' being present or absent in different populations but also
With free choice, all cultural variants will be tolerated by group members, and from the social perspective differences between populations in the form or the function of the behaviors performed. This pattern is not the cost of adopting one variant rather than another is the same. Under this condition, the number of cultural compatible with a simple ecological explanation and points to the importance of social influences in produc-variants present in a group will be limited only by the rate of innovation by group members and the rate of ining and maintaining these population-specific behaviors.
troduction of new variants. Because the variants are learned from group members they fulfill the psychological notion of culture, and if the number of variants within the group is limited they will fulfill our criterion Patterns of Dissemination for culture.
With convention, only a given set of cultural variants within Populations is tolerated for the whole group, and no clustering of particular classes of individuals is observed. New culCulture is a social phenomenon, and thus social structure can have a major influence on the dissemination of tural variants, introduced either by innovation or by immigration from other groups, will tend to be rejected information. Social influences act at different levels at the same time, and we shall differentiate between and will rapidly disappear. Conventions are thought to be reinforced by the different social costs associated them, starting at the highest social level and going down to that of the individual. For cultural transmis-with using different cultural variants. Culture under this model will be more unified in the sense that most sion to occur, a novel behavior, the cultural variant, spreads between individuals within a group. The vari-members of the different subgroups within a population will use the same cultural variants, but it remains variant may appear in a population through innovation or immigration from other populations. However, we able because conventions may embody more than one
option. An example of a convention in chimpanzees is know from all human cultures that not all cultural variants have the same likelihood of being acquired by dipping for driver ants (Boesch and Boesch 1990; Boesch 1996a, b; McGrew 1974; Goodall 1986 ). As we have other group members. What determines which novelties will persist and how cultural changes spread or are seen, ants can be captured with the help of twigs by two different techniques requiring different lengths of tools lost are questions central to most theoretical discussions of the evolution of culture (Alexander 1979; Boyd and different movements, but each technique has been observed in only one population despite the fact that and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1973, 1981; Durham 1991; Flinn and Alexander 1982 ; Lums-one of them is clearly less efficient (Boesch and Boesch 1990) . Such conventions are considered common in huden and Wilson 1981; Wilson 1978). Our present discussion will differ from previous ones in taking a plu-man societies and have typically been attributed to neighboring societies' differentiating themselves from adaptive for the conditions to which this population is exposed. If most individuals face the same set of opeach other with striking differences in dress, greeting customs, and so on.
tions, experience very similar social and ecological conditions, and acquire the options in a similar way, we Finally, given sets of options may be presented to group members through imposition by a subgroup, will observe a stable and unified culture. If, as is more likely, individuals differ in some of these features, the making cultural evolution a political process (Durham 1991) . This is most clearly exemplified in the human variation within the population in terms of cultural variants observed will be too large for it to look like a case, where one group coerces another to adopt major changes in cultural domains (e.g., the Chinese on Tibet-culture. Under this model, it will be very difficult to differentiate between an individual and a cultural learning ans or Europeans on Native Americans). Where a class of individuals forces or manipulates others into adopt-process, as both are expected to favor adaptive solutions. ing certain cultural variants we will observe a culture similar to the one produced by convention, and it is the With the affinity model, in contrast, individuals choose their models from among the collection of indidegree of homogeneity that will differentiate the two. If coercion is not entirely successful, variation will re-viduals that share their options and experiences. The selection of a reference group (as defined by Durham 1991) main at a low level in individuals that resist it.
Imposition may be achieved not only by force but also is directly influenced by the population's social structure and social rules. In our pluralistic approach, this by information manipulation or demonstration. In this category we think of teaching, in which a subgroup in-point is substantial, because group size and composition and social organization and structure vary signifistructs or informs others to acquire a given cultural variant, thereby directly reducing the number of cul-cantly among species and among populations of a single species (Stammbach 1987, Boesch 1996b, Smuts et tural variants available to individuals within the population. Teaching in its modern form in human societies al. 1987). The remaining four models are all affinity models. clearly exemplifies this imposition of cultural knowledge on a large proportion of the population. The best Under the family model, individuals have strongest affinities with family members, and so the choice is cases of teaching in chimpanzees have been observed in the nut-cracking context at Taï (Boesch 1991).
made among the options available within this limited reference group. Cultural changes will follow family genealogies, and cultural differences within the group will the social model be very apparent. This is the classic example of vertical transmission of knowledge from mothers to offspring Within the framework of social norms, individuals will select the cultural variants they observe being per-that has been documented in many animal species. An example of transmission in other directions may be the formed by other group members. The differential success of behavior variants in spreading within a group in-dissemination of potato washing among Japanese macaques, where older individuals acquired the behavior dicates that not all group members are equally good as models. The benefit gained by using some variants may only if one of their offspring had acquired it and youngsters seemed to acquire it from peers (Kawai 1965). play a role in their dissemination, but there are enough examples of cultural behavior patterns that provide no Under the association model, association within a social group is not random and the reference group is seobvious gain or that seem nonadaptive (e.g., the antdipping technique in Taï chimpanzees [Boesch 1996a, lected from among those with whom the individual most frequently associates. In this case, cultural varib] and infanticide or vendetta warfare in various human populations [Chagnon 1988] ) to justify our attempt to ants will be observed mainly between close associates and therefore overlap with sociograms of the group. In understand the role of social models in cultural dissemination. The null hypothesis would be that individuals many cercopithecine species, association is greater between members of the same matriline, and here the choose at random and that all cultural behavior patterns have the same chance of spreading (Lumsden and Wil-family and the association model will produce the same clustering. In chimpanzees association is much less deson 1981); only chance events could lead to one of the options' becoming more prevalent and leading to a cul-pendent upon relatedness, and the two models make different predictions. ture (this process is similar to drift in evolutionary processes [Alexander 1979 , Ridley 1996 ). We shall distinUnder the majority model, individuals choose the options that are being used by the majority of members of guish five social models that will bias the spread of cultural variants, each leading to a particular clustering the population; they consider the cultural variants present in the group and select the ones most commonly of variants: individual, family, association, majority, and prestige. These models are not mutually exclusive; observed. Culture will be much more unified under this model, as a single variant will rapidly reach fixation for a given cultural behavior several models may apply.
With the individual model, individuals face a free-(analogous to genetic selection, fixation is observed when only one cultural variant remains in the populachoice situation and select the cultural variants that provide them with the greatest individual fitness (Daw-tion). In addition, innovations will spread only with difficulty in such a population. kins 1976, Durham 1991 , Wilson 1978 . Existing cultural variants within a population will be the most Under the prestige model, individuals choose the op-bo es ch an d tom a se ll o Chimpanzee and Human Cultures 597 tions that are used by the members of the population commonly accepted assumption that cultural changes are more rapid than genetic ones should be tempered, that they perceive as having the most prestige. Prestige may, however, vary for each individual within a popula-because the more socially constrained the dissemination of the cultural variant, the more slowly changes tion and over time. We will tend to expect similarities that are socially structured; for example, lower-ranking will occur. This may explain the slow dissemination of behavior variants such as potato washing in Japanese individuals will tend to choose higher-ranking individuals and young hunters will select gifted hunters as mod-macaques. Similarly, many traditional human societies prize cultural continuity, and changes in them take els. This process will lead to elaborate clustering in the population's cultural system. place only rather rarely. Homogeneity of a culture is expected only under parThese four affinity models will produce different distributions of cultural variants within the population, ticular combinations of social norms and social models; it is not the rule. The more rigid the social constraints, and this may theoretically allow us to discriminate among them. However, as we have said, they are not the more homogeneous the cultural system of a population. We might expect social pressure to be greater in mutually exclusive. In the example of the Japanese macaques, both the family and the association model may small and highly structured societies than in very large and loosely organized ones. Egalitarian societies will have been at work. The slow acquisition of this behavior has made it possible to see these patterns, but once generally be less rigid, as in chimpanzees and some human hunter-gatherers, and probably less homogeneous. fully acquired it would be difficult to differentiate the combined effect of the two models from that of a major-At the same time, in a huge modern Western society many cultural variants can survive side by side in most ity model. It remains important, however, to differentiate between these models, because there is no a priori domains. Homogeneity is expected mainly in averagesized populations with considerable imposition. reason to believe that all cultural systems in animal and human populations will make equal use of all of them.
Social norms reduce the diversity of cultural variants within the group, and social models increase the clusSocial norms and social models are often combined, and social constraints on both levels have as their main tering of variants. Here, we face the ''cultural paradox'': culture requires sociality with social learning, but this effect reducing the rate of cultural change (table 2) . For example, we may find within a single population a ma-very sociality may hinder cultural evolution. It is obvious from table 2 that one answer to this paradox is jority model that blocks all variants for a feeding habit, a prestige model for greeting gestures that allows few found in social structure. It is social structure that imposes social constraints on cultural change, and thus an variants, and an individual model for food calls, and here both rapid and very slow cultural changes will be understanding of the dynamics of cultural evolution requires an understanding of social change. Socially, culexpected. This exemplifies the risk associated with using rate of cultural change as a criterion for culture. The tural innovations are not all equal. When the innovators are members of an imposing group or prestigious, group members are prepared to learn from them, and cultural t abl e 2 changes may be very rapid. will be mainly vertical, and in the prestige and associaa A direct function of the number of family members present in tion models it will be mainly horizontal or oblique. One the population. b A direct function of the social clustering within the population.
important addition, here, is that dissemination may be direct or indirect. When direct, there is perceptual con-things about others in its group, e.g., about dominance relations, is not social learning in this sense). There are tact between the model and the chooser; transmission takes place within a single group and between genera-a number of different ways in which individuals in a group may come to behave similarly (Whiten and Ham tions living at the same time. When indirect, transmission can be effected between individuals who are not in 1992) and these various processes may be explicated most clearly by distinguishing the learning of instruperceptual contact. Obviously, the acquisition mechanism can operate only if the information is made avail-mental behaviors such as tool use from that of social behaviors such as gestural communication. able to naive individuals in the absence of the model, and this is possible only if the information can be stored in an abstract form (Heyes 1994) . This mode allows instrumental behavior cultural change on a larger scale by facilitating transmission over much greater time and space ranges. It is Perhaps the simplest social learning process in instrumental situations is local enhancement (Thorpe 1956) typical of modern human societies and seems to be exclusive to them, indicating that language may make for or stimulus enhancement (Spence 1937). Local enhancement is widespread in the animal kingdom and rea qualitative difference and that human cultures based on this type of transmission may be capable of much fers to situations in which animals are attracted to the locations at which conspecifics are behaving (or perhaps more rapid evolution.
Using different reference groups may provide differ-to stimuli with which they are interacting). This then places them in a position to learn something that they ent benefits, and one obvious one is that it makes it easier to evaluate options. Young group members have would not otherwise have learned, and what they learn is often identical to what their conspecifics are learning. much to learn during the socialization process, and relying on different reference groups is one way to make a Nothing is actually learned from the behavior of others.
Animals may, however, sometimes learn things choice without having to evaluate all the alternatives through long and elaborate testing, especially when about the environment by observing the manipulations of others. For example, by observing others one individthey involve aspects the benefits of which cannot be directly ascertained. This process may in the end cause ual may learn that a nut can be cracked and food found inside, a log can be rolled over and food found under it, some individuals to adopt less efficient solutions, but the time gained in selecting options may compensate sand comes off food when it is in water, and a piece of fruit hit with a stick may fall to the ground. In the terfor this. An alternative is that the differences in benefits between options may be too small to warrant elaborate minology of Gibson (1979) , by observing the manipulations of other animals individuals may learn ''affordselection procedures (Dawkins 1976 , Durham 1991 .
In conclusion, social constraints can dramatically af-ances'' of the environment that they would be unlikely to discover on their own. The process whereby an indifect cultural dissemination and cultural changes in various ways. Two important predictions may be advanced. vidual observes and learns some dynamic affordances of the inanimate world as a result of the behavior of other First, the stronger the social constraints, the less rapid the dissemination of cultural variants. This can in the animals and then uses what it has learned to devise its own behavioral strategies is called emulation learning extreme prevent the introduction of a new cultural variant into a population. Second, cultural homogeneity (Tomasello 1990 (Tomasello , 1996 .
Despite the power of local enhancement and emulawill be expected in only a relatively few rigidly controlled populations; otherwise, cultural systems will be tion learning to help individuals benefit from the knowledge and skills of others, these processes operate quite heterogeneous not only within a single population but sometimes even for a single cultural domain within without the individual's paying attention to the behavior of other individuals at all. In some circumstances, that population.
in contrast, individuals seek to reproduce the behavior of others, presumably by noting some potential correspondence between it and their own behavior. How this
Mechanisms of Social Learning
is done varies as a function of the way in which the individual understands the behavior of others. For examIn addition to the question of which individuals in a population are exposed to and engage in a particular be-ple, the mimicking of human speech by some birds is behavioral reproduction that would seem to take place havioral practice, there is the question of how those individuals acquire that practice. This is an important on the perceptual or sensory-motor level only, since the birds do not seem to understand the human purpose of question in the current context because behavioral traditions whose origin and maintenance depend on differ-these sounds-at least not in the way that children learn linguistic symbols for conventional communicaent acquisition mechanisms may have very different properties with regard to their stability in the face of tive purposes. Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner (1993) have argued that humans perceive and understand the changing ecological or social conditions. The term ''social learning,'' as it is typically used by psychologists, behavior of others in intentional terms-they see another's behavior as ''cleaning the window'' rather than refers to situations in which one individual comes to behave similarly to others (thus, one animal's learning as ''moving her hand in a circular motion on the surface bo es ch an d tom a se ll o Chimpanzee and Human Cultures 599 of the window while holding a cloth''-and so when
The behavioral traditions of chimpanzees in the wild may be supported by either emulation learning or imitathey seek to reproduce a behavior only certain aspects of the behavior appear relevant; for example, they may tive learning. The wild behavior that has been documented in most detail is clearly nut cracking. As shown not consider which hand is used or how many times the surface is wiped. This is the archetype of imitative previously, this is a behavior whose geographical distribution in West Africa is almost certainly not exlearning, at least in its human form: reproduction of both the behavior and its intended result. plainable in ecological terms. Which of the two social learning processes is responsible for the cultural transIn general, experimental studies with captive chimpanzees have found little evidence of the imitative mission is unknown, and therefore we shall discuss both. If a single chimpanzee in West Africa had inlearning of instrumental behaviors. For example, Tomasello et al. (1987) trained an adult chimpanzee demon-vented nut cracking, its behavior would have left a stone hammer, some uncracked nuts, and some cracked strator to rake food items into her cage with a metal T-bar, in some cases in very distinctive ways. Young nuts all in one place near a suitable substrate-very propitious learning conditions that might have facilitated chimpanzees that observed these behaviors learned more quickly than a control group, demonstrating some the individual learning of others. Moreover, observation of its behavior would have demonstrated various afeffect of their observations. However, they mostly used their own strategies to rake in the food, and not a single fordances of nuts and stones. Thus, the combination of propitious learning conditions and processes of local individual copied the distinctive techniques used by the demonstrator when the food was in an especially diffi-enhancement and emulation learning might have resulted in the acquisition of nut cracking by the invencult location. Similar results were obtained by Nagell, Olguin, and Tomasello (1993), who gave chimpanzees tor's groupmates. This hypothesis is supported by the research of Sumita, Kitahara-Frisch, and Norikoshi and children a tool that could be used in either of two ways with the same end result. Some subjects observed (1985) , who looked very closely at the acquisition of nut cracking by individual chimpanzees in a captive group a (human) demonstration of one method of tool use and other subjects observed a demonstration of the other, setting and found that acquisition was very slow and gradual for all individuals and highly idiosyncratic. more efficient method. Whereas children in general copied the method of the demonstrator, whichever it They concluded that individual trial-and-error learning (along with local enhancement) was responsible for the was (imitative learning), chimpanzees used the same method or methods no matter which demonstration spread of the behavior in the group. At the same time, the imitative-learning hypothesis for nut cracking has they observed (emulation learning). In a recent experiment with a similar logic, Whiten et al. (1996) found intriguing support. Boesch (1996a, b) compared the nut cracking of a captive group of chimpanzees with that of some evidence that chimpanzees could copy human behavior in opening a box containing food. For example, the Taï chimpanzees in the wild in terms of the specific behavioral strategies used. What he found was that of chimpanzees that saw a human push a stick through a lock, allowing the box to be opened, performed this be-the 14 strategies used by the captive group (e.g., hitting the nut with a hand, shaking it, stabbing it with a stick, havior quite often, whereas chimpanzees that saw a human pull the stick out (with a twisting motion) per-throwing it against a hard surface), only 6 have been observed in Taï chimpanzees (and these employed one formed that behavior. However, Tomasello (1996) has suggested that emulation learning may also have been strategy not observed in the captive group). The argument was that the behavior of the Taï chimpanzees had at work in this case, as the human manipulations in all cases served to reveal distinctive affordances of the for-become socially ''canalized'' into certain strategies even though the desired end result of cracking the nut was aging box.
Interestingly, it is chimpanzees raised in human-like obviously the same in both groups-suggesting the possibility of imitative learning. ways that provide the clearest evidence of imitative learning in instrumental contexts. For example, Toma-
The other example outlined in detail above concerns ant dipping, in which many adult Gombe chimpanzees sello, Savage-Rumbaugh, and Kruger (1993) studied the social learning of mother-reared captive chimpanzees have been observed to use one technique and almost all adult Taï chimpanzees another. Such group differences and bonobos, enculturated chimpanzees and bonobos (raised in human-like cultural environments), and two-in method of accomplishing the same goal are clearly suggestive of imitative learning. One argument against year-old children. Each subject was shown 24 different and novel actions on objects and encouraged to repro-such an explanation is the possibility that what is being observed is individual rather than group differences. duce them: children were told to ''do this,'' and the apes were pretrained to reproduce the modeled actions. The However, the large number of adults in both populations consistently using their group-specific method of major result was that the mother-reared apes hardly ever engaged in imitative learning in which they repro-dipping for ants makes this a very good candidate for a cultural behavior transmitted by means of imitative duced both the end and the means of the novel actions, while the enculturated apes and the children imita-learning-to the degree that we can rule out possible ecological differences between the two locales in terms tively learned the novel actions much more frequently (and equally).
of such things as the living conditions and behavior of the ants being caught and eaten. Boesch's personal test-behavior in repeated instances of a social interaction. For example, a juvenile may initiate play with a peer ing (1990, 1996a, b) of the two group-specific techniques on driver ants at the two sites has suggested that without warning simply by jumping on him to wrestle, slapping him on the head as she does so. The recipient the ecological conditions prevailing at those sites cannot explain the observed differences.
may notice that such initiations always begin with the initiator's raising her arm in preparation for slapping Overall, then, chimpanzee social learning of instrumental behaviors clearly involves processes of emula-and so anticipate by responding to that ''intention movement'' alone (Tinbergen 1951). The initiator notion learning that are almost certainly an important force in human cultural transmission as well in such tices the recipient's anticipation and understands that the ''intention movement'' by itself is sufficient to inithings as tool use. Imitative learning has been demonstrated in some captive chimpanzees and is a viable ex-tiate the play and so in some future encounter raises her arm to initiate play. A slight variation on this process planation for nut cracking and ant dipping in wild chimpanzees. Why not all chimpanzees exhibit this ability occurs with a special class of chimpanzee signals that have been called ''attention-getters.'' These consist of and how frequently imitative learning takes place in wild chimpanzees remain very open questions at this behaviors such as slapping the ground that make a noise so that others look at the signaler-who may be dispoint. Most of these experiments have been done with captive animals, whose lives are in many ways less cog-playing a play face or an aggressive or sexual posture to which the signal serves to draw attention. This is ontonitively and socially complex than those of their wild conspecifics, and, indeed, studies with animals raised genetic ritualization of a spontaneously produced behavior rather than an intention movement, but the proand enculturated like children seem to show more persuasive skills in imitative learning. Thus the issue be-cess is essentially the same.
The point is that in both of these forms of ontogenetic comes whether the enculturated chimpanzees are simply experiencing some of the complexities that wild ritualization, two individuals essentially shape one another's behavior over time. It is not the case that one chimpanzees experience and so are more representative of life in the wild or whether human training has given individual is seeking to imitate the behavior of another, and so this is not imitative learning. There is no questhem some species-atypical skills and abilities and it is the captive animals that are the more representative.
tion that ontogenetic ritualization plays a very important role in the genesis of many chimpanzee gestural A further issue, assuming that an individual is capable of imitative learning, is under what conditions signals and very likely many human gestures (Tomasello and Camaioni 1997). The question, then, is this individual will learn a task through emulation or through imitative learning. One possible answer is that whether imitative learning plays some role as well. The most systematic investigation of this question is by Toimitative learning requires a ''good'' model. Individuals will imitate only if they have acceptable family, associ-masello and colleagues, observing a colony of captive chimpanzees (Tomasello, Call, et al. 1994 , Tomasello, ation, or prestige models; otherwise they will prefer to conduct detailed tests of alternatives to avoid failure. George, et al. 1985, Tomasello, Gust, and Frost 1989) .
The main result for current purposes is that there is litOrangutans have been shown to learn only from certain special social partners (Russon and Galdikas 1995). tle or no evidence for imitative learning in the communicative gestures of these chimpanzees. First, these Chimpanzees in the wild and those enculturated like children will have such good models; captive chimpan-captive individuals produce a number of idiosyncratic signals (Goodall 1986 also reports this for the Kasakela zees mostly do not. Another possibility is that an individual learns imitatively when it pays to do so and will community at Gombe). Second, many youngsters also produce signals that they have never had directed to not do so for all tasks. This raises the question under what conditions imitation is better than emulation or them (for example, others have never begged food or solicited tickling or nursing from them). Third, longitudilocal enhancement. Humans do not learn everything by imitation despite possessing the ability, and this may nal observations have revealed considerable individuality in the use of gestures and individual variability both also be true of other animal species. One explanation is that in tasks that require a certain amount of individual within and across generations. Finally, in an experimental investigation it was found that when an individual evaluation of results it is better not to imitate.
was removed from the group and taught an arbitrary signal (by means of which it obtained desired food from communicative behavior a human) observing individuals never reproduced that signal. Communicative behavior presents a slightly different set of issues for questions of social learning. The main There are two sets of studies relevant to the social learning skills of enculturated chimpanzees in the doissue is that many communicative behaviors may be learned by a process called ontogenetic ritualization main of communication. As in the case of instrumental behaviors, they show that at least some chimpanzees that is simply not available in the instrumental domain because it depends on the interaction of two individu-with the appropriate kinds of experience can learn to imitate novel behaviors. The first set of studies, dealing als. In ontogenetic ritualization a communicatory signal is created by two individuals shaping one another's with the process by which apes learn human-like com-bo es ch an d tom a se ll o Chimpanzee and Human Cultures 601 municative symbols, initially indicated that for apes tive learning. Captive chimpanzees provide very little evidence that an individual can observe another indilearning a manual sign language by far the most effective technique was a molding of the hands and that imi-vidual signaling for a communicative purpose and then, when it has the ''same'' communicative purpose, protation was a poor way to teach the animals signs (Fouts 1972) . Since then Savage- Rumbaugh et al. (1986) have duce the same gestural signal. Chimpanzees raised and trained by humans in something like human sign lanreported that the bonobo Kanzi acquired all of his earliest communicative symbols via imitative learning, in guage may learn some of their signals by means of imitative learning, which is clearly the case for arbitrary this case by manually contacting the lexigrams on a keyboard (although the documentation for this was very body movements. Many months of fairly intensive training are required for this skill to show itself, howinformal). The same basic finding also applies to a common chimpanzee raised and trained in much the same ever, and the question is therefore whether it is a case of humans providing chimpanzees with the kind of rich way (Savage- Rumbaugh et al. 1993) . The movements involved here are quite simple (touching a particular place environments and motivations that more closely resemble the wild situation or whether, on the contrary, on a keyboard), but the communicative functions reproduced-the referential situations appropriate for differ-we are witnessing a case of animals being trained to do human-like things that they would not do if left to their ent signs-may be quite complex. The second set of studies has examined the copying of movements spe-own devices.
The comparison with humans in the domain of comcifically. Hayes and Hayes (1952) trained their humanraised chimpanzee Viki to mimic various body move-munication involves language acquisition, of course.
Linguistic symbols can only be learned via imitative ments and gestures, for example, blinking the eyes or clapping the hands, over a seven-month period. In gen-learning, since there is virtually no way to discover arbitrary social conventions on one's own. Similar to eral, she reproduced them faithfully over time; she had clearly ''gotten the idea'' of the mimicking game. Cus-human-raised chimpanzees, children do not start to learn linguistic symbols very rapidly. It is only after tance, Whiten, and Bard (1996) have more rigorously demonstrated similar abilities in two nursery-reared many months of social interaction in a symbol-rich environment that children start to learn a few words. chimpanzees that had been trained for several months much as Viki had been.
After some years, children in all cultures acquire much of their communicative repertoire through imitative In the wild, one communicative gesture, leaf clipping, has been claimed to be culturally transmitted or learned learning. In terms of frequency, by even the most conservative estimates this would involve the learning by by means of imitative learning. Initially thought to be unique to the Mahale K group (Nishida 1980), it was children in all cultures of several new linguistic symbols per day for a period of some years (Carey 1982). later observed by Sugiyama (1981) in another group across the continent and by Boesch (1995) in the Taï Language and possibly some cultural conventions are clearly learned through imitative learning in humans. group. The general point is that leaf clipping has been observed in several groups that have not had the opportunity to observe one another. Either the behavior has teaching been spontaneously invented in all these groups by some kind of ritualization process, perhaps with some If teaching is defined very broadly to include any behavior of one animal that serves to assist another animal's within-group emulation learning as individuals discover the affordances of the leaf for noise making by ob-learning, teaching is relatively common in the animal kingdom (Caro and Hauser 1992). But flexible and inserving others rip up leaves, or it has been imitatively learned from an inventor. Leaf clipping as an attention-sightful forms of instruction in which one individual intends that another acquire a skill or piece of knowledge getter would have a very general communicative function; its immediate effect is that others look at the noise and adjusts its behavior contingent on the learner's progress in skill or knowledge would seem to be very maker, who may be engaged in some other communicative display (for example, expressing a mood). There is rare. Adopting this intentional definition of teaching, Boesch (1991) observed a number of instances of teachthus much room for individual learning of the more specific communicative functions. However, at Taï, as we ing among Taï chimpanzees in the context of nut cracking. He divided his observations into ''facilitation'' and have seen, leaf clipping was used systematically for ten years by adult males not in an attention-getting situa-''active teaching.'' Observations of facilitation were fairly common and included such things as mothers' tion but mostly when alone and warming up for the drumming sequence near a large buttress tree, and leaving intact nuts for their infants to crack (which they never did for other individuals) or placing hammers and therefore Boesch's (1995) recent observations on the change in function of leaf clipping for many Taï chim-nuts in the right position near the anvil for their infants to use. Active teaching was observed in only two inpanzees are intriguing and await an explanation.
In line with the social learning of instrumental be-stances, one in which a mother slowed down and modified her nut cracking and one in which a mother modihaviors, then, the learning of communicative gestures and signals by wild chimpanzees involves emulation fied her son's positioning of the nut-in both cases as adjustments to the difficulties their offspring were havlearning, ontogenetic ritualization, and probably imita-ing with the procedure. These instances of active teach-many (but by no means all) human cultural traditions.
Many human cultural traditions show an accumulation ing are very important because they seem to be of the type characteristic of all human cultures as they in-of modifications over generations in the direction of greater complexity, in such a way that a wider range of struct their youngsters in at least some important cultural activities (Kruger and Tomasello 1996) . This kind functions is encompassed. This may be called cumulative cultural evolution or the ratchet effect (by analogy of instruction may be seen as a very powerful facilitator of social learning, since carefully crafted demonstra-with the device that keeps things in place while the user prepares to advance them further). For example, tions would seem to frame and support developing youngsters' attempts at imitative learning. Facilitation the way in which human beings have sheltered themselves has evolved significantly over human history as would also seem to be important, as it exposes youngsters to novel learning experiences, but in this case the individuals in particular cultures have adapted their existing shelters to shield them from various aspects of learning is left up to them. the weather (e.g., rain, cold, sun) and various types of predators and pests, to provide themselves with privacy and protection from groupmates, and so on. Although
Cultural Change and Evolution we do not have such detailed artifactual records, it is presumably the case that some cultural rituals and conIt is clear from all of the foregoing that chimpanzees learn from one another socially and thus transmit infor-ventions (e.g., human languages and religious rituals) have become more complex over time and been modimation culturally. How they do so is important not only in its own right but also for attempts to determine fied to meet novel communicative and social needs.
This process may be more characteristic of some huwhether there are different kinds of cultural change and evolution for different cultural traditions or for different man cultures and some behavioral practices than of others, but all human societies would seem to have at least species. Specifically, it may be important for distinguishing chimpanzee culture and its evolution from hu-some artifacts produced by the ratchet effect (at the very least language and a few tools). man cultural evolution.
Cultural evolution refers to a number of processes by The problem in the case of chimpanzees is that we have not observed them in their natural habitats for which a cultural tradition-multiple individuals in a group performing the same socially learned behavior for long enough to know whether some of their practices show the ratchet effect; 30 years is simply not the same function-within a population may change over time. For example, a particular tradition may sim-enough time. Moreover, the foregoing analysis of social constraints on the dissemination of cultural variants ply die out; this may happen if the environmental function somehow disappears (e.g., an insect prey disappears among chimpanzees suggests that any cumulative cultural evolution may be limited to a small subset within from the local environment) or if the social structure of the group somehow changes so that youngsters no a population or a few selected traditions. It may even be that in chimpanzee society new cultural variants are longer come into contact with the appropriate social models (e.g., are suddenly not allowed to go with adult actively discouraged in many domains, the way they are for some domains of activity in some human cultures. males to hunt). Alternatively, if it serves its functions adequately and the relevant environmental conditions We do not know, then, to what extent some chimpanzee cultural traditions may show cumulative cultural remain constant, a cultural tradition may persist over a long period of time. Beyond simply dying out or staying evolution of the type that seems to make many human artifacts so useful and powerful both cognitively and sothe same, moreover, some cultural traditions change over time in ways that seem to be adaptive. One way cially.
It seems possible, however, that chimpanzee cultures might be termed ''drift''; for example, an insect prey may change its habitat, thus leading the group to adapt do not evidence cumulative cultural traditions to the same extent as human cultures. Two aspects of the to the changed conditions through individual and social learning. Another might be termed ''branching,'' with a transmission landscape of chimpanzee cultures may limit the effectiveness of the ratchet effect; ''slippage'' single cultural tradition spawning variants for different situations, for example, as leaf clipping by the Taï chim-in the transmission of information can limit both the range and the precision of this effect, and inconsistent panzees, originally used only in the drumming context, began being used in the resting context as well and as transmission can block it altogether. With regard to the first, local enhancement, emulation learning, and ontoleaf grooming in Gombe chimpanzees has branched from an unclear function to include ectoparasite genetic ritualization allow for too much slippage or noise in the transmission process to produce good ratchsquashing (Boesch 1995). The branching process might be supposed to allow for more rapid diversification, as ets. Thus, if one individual chimpanzee invented a more efficient way of ant dipping that applied to a wider it would seem to require less in the way of innovation than the creation of totally new cultural behaviors.
variety of ant species (e.g., by moving the stick in a particular way that led more ants to crawl onto it), youngFinally, there is another kind of evolutionary change that may or may not be characteristic of chimpanzee sters capable only of emulation learning would not reproduce this precise variation because they would not cultural traditions, and that is the type displayed by bo es ch an d tom a se ll o Chimpanzee and Human Cultures 603 focus on the innovator's behavioral techniques. Young-The problem with testing our two hypotheses is simply that at the moment there are no data that would allow sters that were capable of imitative learning (and judged that the innovation was ''better'' than their current us to quantify the frequency of imitative learning events in either chimpanzee or human societies. practice) would adopt the new behavioral technique with very little slippage, and this might then set the The question of cultural evolution is a vitally important one. Understanding the differences between culstage for further innovations that built upon one another across generations. This same process would tural evolution processes in chimpanzees and in humans will help us to identify what is unique about the seem to be at work in the case of social behaviors such as communicative gestures as well, with cumulative artifacts and practices of the two species and what makes them such powerful facilitators of individual cultural evolution occurring only if youngsters copy conspecifics relatively faithfully over time. Slippage cognition and practice (Tomasello and Call 1997) . Children inherit from their forebears not just their genes but strongly limits the precision and range of information acquired through the ratchet effect. It may be that it is their environments, full of cultural products (including language) with long histories of invention, use, and teaching that best limits slippage and only once teaching is regularly used will the ratchet effect work effec-modification, and ''all'' they have to do is imitatively learn from others how to participate in the requisite tively. Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner (1993) have hypothesized that chimpanzee cultural traditions and practices. Whether chimpanzees have the social cognitive skills to create and participate in artifacts and pracartifacts do not show the ratchet effect because chimpanzees do not often imitate the instrumental actions tices in this way is unknown at this time. We have suggested two hypotheses for the possible absence of the of conspecifics or engage in intentional teaching. It is a paradox that cumulative cultural evolution depends on ratchet effect in chimpanzees. In addition, we need to consider the possibility that chimpanzees may live in two processes, innovation and imitative learning (perhaps assisted by active teaching), one of which is typi-a social and physical environment in which elaborate cultural artifacts resulting from the ratchet effect are cally an individual enterprise and the other of which excludes individual testing. Cumulative cultural evo-rarely needed. lution implies a combination of individual evaluation of the cultural variants present in a population and faithful imitation of the variant that has been judged to Conclusion be the ''best.'' Thus, whereas chimpanzees are quite adept at individual cognition and even cultural innovation Ideally, with enough information, we should be able to construct for specific populations of both humans and (Boesch 1995, Kummer and Goodall 1965), they may not be so adept at the imitative learning and active chimpanzees a kind of catalogue of ''cultural phenotypes.'' In this catalogue, a specific tradition in a speteaching that serve to pass along these innovations to others; the evidence, as cited above, is incomplete. cific population would be described both in terms of the social norms/models that determine its social distribuThe second possibility is that inconsistent transmission may block cumulative cultural evolution. Not all tion and in terms of the social learning mechanisms that support the tradition and its patterns of change individuals of a species may be able to imitate, or some individuals may not imitate all possible models. This over time. We are currently very far from this ideal, mostly because of a lack of basic descriptive informamay have as an effect that new cumulative changes will only irregularly or rarely be transmitted, thereby tion on specific cultural traditions and how they work in specific populations of both humans and chimpanblocking the ratchet effect. Boyd and Richerson (1996) have speculated in a paper entitled ''Why Culture Is zees.
In the meantime, the central theoretical point in all Common and Cultural Evolution Is Rare'' that imitation and teaching, the psychological supports for cumu-of the foregoing-a point that we believe should guide future research efforts-is that culture is not a thing but lative cultural evolution, may be rarer in individuals of other species than they are in humans. If only some in-a set of processes. These processes show much diversity both in the social norms and models that determine dividuals imitate and teach and/or do so only rarely, cumulative cultural evolution will be quite difficult, as which individuals will be exposed to particular cultural variants and in the social learning mechanisms that dethere will be many weak links in the chain of transmission. The argument is thus that the difference between termine the fidelity of transmission of the variants over time. Recognition of the diversity of social norms and human and chimpanzee cultural transmission mechanisms is not qualitative but only a quantitative differ-models is important because it means that we must look for cultural outcomes not just at the population ence in the frequency and prevalence of imitation and teaching, which may lead to qualitative differences in level but also in various subpopulations and identify the social norms that constrain their dissemination. Recogthe types of cultural evolution that may occur. This hypothesis would account for the fact that in some chim-nition of the diversity of social learning mechanisms is important because manner of transmission is an imporpanzee populations and for some tasks imitative and teaching abilities are most likely present but no evi-tant determinant of patterns of cultural change and evolution. dence of cumulative evolution has yet been gathered.
In comparing chimpanzee and human cultures, we cannot hope to understand the branches and leaves of this tree without an understanding of these roots. In have noted many deep similarities. Both chimpanzees and humans have patterns of activities that are socially performing comparative studies with chimpanzees in particular, it is vitally important that we not become learned and that persist across generations, helping youngsters to adapt to their environments in ways that distracted by volatile issues of human uniqueness or lack of uniqueness but focus on both the similarities presumably are more efficient and less costly to learn than any techniques they might discover for them-and the differences so that we may understand more deeply the working of culture as an evolutionary proselves. However, we have also pointed briefly to one possible difference involving the use of indirect means cess. of transmission, language, that may allow humans to transmit information over greater stretches of time and space and perhaps even to transmit different kinds of information. We also have indicated another possible Comments difference involving cumulative cultural evolution as produced by the ratchet effect (which was probably necessary for the evolution of modern languages). Some human cultural traditions and artifacts seem to accumu-r ic h ar d w. byrne
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16 iii 98 on individuals' imitating the behavioral strategies of others and possibly on active instruction at a certain rate. Whether chimpanzees have some traditions of this A key concept that emerges from Boesch and Tomasello's discussion is that of emulation learning. This is type is unknown because we have not been observing them for long enough to know. This is therefore a very taken to be a probable ability of chimpanzees and used as the ''kill-joy'' alternative in attempts to discover imiimportant question for future research. If it turns out that what distinguishes human culture is both language tation. I question whether emulation learning has been sufficiently well established to function as a null hyand cumulative cultural traditions depending on imitation and teaching, it is plausible to look for a common pothesis in this way and whether its definition is precise enough for reliable identification of its operation. explanation in the way in which human beings understand one another as intentional and mental agents, Emulation is a slippery customer. Tomasello et al. (1987) suggested that when chimpanzees observed raksince this understanding allows them both to learn from and to communicate with others in new and pow-ing what was made more salient was the tool in its function as tool. Later, the word ''emulation'' was used erful ways (Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner 1993).
Before we come to such a conclusion, however, we for the situation in which a focus on the demonstrator's goal may lead the observer to be attracted to and seek must obtain more descriptive information on chimpanzee and human populations in their natural habitats, to attain the goal and therefore attempt to reproduce it by whatever means it can devise (Tomasello 1990) . This and we must conduct more focused studies as well. Some of the questions most in need of answers are the definition does not readily include learning an object's function as a tool, but Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner following: (1) What are the relative rates of imitation and instruction (as well as innovation) in human and (1993) clarify, describing emulation now as affordance learning: seeing a jar opened might allow the observer chimpanzee populations? (2) What is the role of social constraints in human and chimpanzee cultures? (3) Are to recognize that the jar affords opening. Tomasello (1996:321) states that in emulation learning the learner there chimpanzee cultural traditions that we have not seen because they are confined to subgroups within observes and understands a change of state in the world produced by the manipulations of another, giving as expopulations (e.g., families)? (4) Is there cumulative cultural evolution in some chimpanzee traditions that we amples the discoveries by observation that food may be located under logs, nuts can be cracked, and a stick's cannot see because we have not been observing for long enough or perhaps not observing in the appropriate hitting a fruit will make it fall. By this point, emulation learning would seem to have departed a long way from ways? (5) Is the reason that chimpanzees do not imitatively learn very well in captivity without human in-Wood's (1989) original usage and to have become rather ambiguous. Among other possibilities, its meanings struction that they have grown up in impoverished conditions or that they need human instruction to acquire might include the following:
1. Setting a goal. Having seen the favourable result of this skill? (6) Is the reason that human-raised chimpanzees imitate more readily that they have lived in captive another's actions, the observer tries to get the same reward in whatever way it can; the observed result has conditions more like their own rich social lives in the wild or that they need human instruction to acquire become a current goal. This phenomenon, if it exists, can be modelled as a simple priming effect (Byrne 1994, this skill?
It is clear that the processes that make up the human Byrne and Russon n.d).
2. Learning the physical properties of objects. Having cultural tree have very deep evolutionary roots, and we bo es ch an d tom a se ll o Chimpanzee and Human Cultures 605 seen a change of state effected, the observer knows b en n ett g. gal e f jr.
Department of Psychology, McMaster University, more about the physical nature of an object: that nuts crack, that rocks are heavy and hard, that fruit pedun-Hamilton, Ont., Canada L8S 4K1. 30 iii 98 cles are flimsy.
3. Learning relationships among objects. Having seen The authors of this article are to be congratulated for providing both a comprehensive account of current evian object manipulated, the observer knows more about the structural relationships that make it up or into dence of tradition in chimpanzees and a useful framework for comparing traditions in humans and apes. I which it meshes: that nuts are hollow and contain food, that rocks can cover food, that lids are threaded.
am, however, concerned that the article does not address some fundamental conceptual and evidential 4. Learning what can be done with an object. Having seen an object used in a particular way, the observer problems in the search for ''the evolutionary roots of human culture.'' Three such problems (discussed in knows that this functional use is possible for this sort of object: a stick can be used as a rake, the lid of a jar greater detail in Galef 1992) are as follows:
1. Is culture a trait open to selection and consequent can be unscrewed, nuts can be smashed by striking them with rocks, a rod can be slid through a hole, fruit evolution? Culture is not a characteristic of individuals, and therefore culture per se cannot, in the biological can be knocked down by swiping at it with sticks.
This last would seem to be what Tomasello (1990) in-sense, evolve. Individuals may have cognitive processes enabling them to develop traditions; such cognitive protended; certainly, if a chimpanzee could learn tool function by observation, it would account for the results of cesses are characteristics of individuals, open to selection and to elaboration by evolution, and possibly inTomasello et al. (1987) , and his more recent definitions mention ''dynamic affordances.'' The trouble is that crease the ability of individuals to acquire socially and transmit patterns of behavior. However, evolution of this is intrinsically about doing something with an object: raking, screwing, striking, swiping, sliding, etc. cognitive processes supporting culture is not at all the same thing as evolution of culture itself. These are actions, and therefore emulation learning of this sort means associating a particular action with an 2. Are the ''cultures'' of chimpanzees and humans homologous? If culture is not an evolving characteristic of object. For some this simply is imitation (e.g., Heyes 1994). In any case, this phenomenon is going to be hard populations and increasing complexity in culture reflects the evolution of cognitive processes underlying to distinguish from imitation, and indeed the data Tomasello et al. (1987) describe as emulation have been the ability to acquire socially and transmit behavior, then only those chimpanzee traditions that express suggested instead to show imitation of one act from a sequence (Whiten and Ham 1992) or imitation at an in-social-learning processes homologous to those that support human culture should be discussed as possible anappropriately general level of hierarchical organization (Byrne and Russon n.d.). There is no fully convincing tecedents of human culture. It follows that unless one believes, for example, that local enhancement someevidence yet that chimpanzees can learn by observation what actions can be performed with an object (rela-how evolved into active teaching, language, imitation, or some other process important in the maintenance of tional emulation) instead of how to perform them (imitation).
human culture, chimpanzee traditions resulting from local enhancement are not relevant to discussion of the The two other senses of emulation learning-observational learning of physical properties and of relation-roots of human culture.
Unfortunately, in free-living chimpanzees, traditions ships-are worth further investigation. In these cases, it should prove possible experimentally to divorce the that reflect cognitive processes such as imitation and active teaching are difficult to discriminate from tradicrucial revelations from the actions that typically produce them. Problems may arise in distinguishing rela-tions resting on cognitive processes such as local enhancement that are not true antecedents of human cultionship learning from much simpler, associative explanations: for instance, linking the taste of nut meat with ture.
3. If chimpanzees have culture like that of humans, the sight of the unopened nut rather than appreciating notions of containment and hollowness. However, the why is evidence of active teaching or imitation and of ratcheting so weak in wild chimpanzees? It is generally more elaborated representations should generalize to other tasks involving containment and hollowness, agreed that social transmission processes that simply call the attention of an observer to aspects of the enviwhereas associative linking would remain specific to nut cracking. ronment that others are exploiting (e.g., local enhancement, passive teaching, emulation) cannot provide a baThe challenge is worth some effort, for it is about understanding not merely how animals learn to deal with sis for cumulative cultural change (ratcheting). Once these forms of social learning have focussed attention physical problems but how they understand and represent the world. Is this a matter of relational operators on some aspect of the environment, individuals must learn for themselves how to manipulate that portion of like ''under,'' ''inside,'' and ''through,'' material descriptors like ''brittle,'' ''tough,'' ''heavy,'' ''flimsy,'' or just the environment. No individual can copy behavioral innovations of its predecessors, and, almost by definition, an undifferentiated mass of associations as animallearning theorists would suppose? no cumulative cultural change can occur.
The characteristic of human culture that makes it so sion themselves. There is no incompatibility here; rather, the two sets of approaches are perfectly complecentral to human life is its cumulative potential. Each generation can inherit intact the innovations of preced-mentary. It stands to reason that if information is to be transmitted across the generations so as to form a culing generations, improve upon that inheritance, and pass on improved behavioral variants. Over generations, tural tradition, then mechanisms must be in place to enable such transmission to occur. Furthermore, this patterns of behavior develop that no individual could acquire as a result of his/her asocial interaction with complementarity of approach is underwritten by a complex of shared assumptions which are implicit in the the physical environment.
While evidence of traditions in both free-living chim-metaphor of transmission, in the notion of ''cultural variants'' as particles of transmissible information, and panzees and other wild animals is overwhelming, evidence in any nonhuman species of free-living animal of in the idea of behaviour as their observable expression.
These assumptions, however, which remain pervateaching, imitation, or cumulative culture is not strong. For example, Boesch, after ten years of field observation, sive in biological and psychological circles, have long since been abandoned by the majority of social and culreports two incidents that he interprets as instances of active teaching by chimpanzees. Others who have tural anthropologists-albeit with notable exceptions (Sperber 1996) . Yet, paradoxically, in addressing the watched wild chimpanzees for hundreds of man years report active teaching by chimpanzees even less fre-quintessentially anthropological ''problem of culture,'' Boesch and Tomasello completely bypass recent and quently than Boesch. If active teaching exists in chimpanzees and is adaptive, it is surprising that it is ex-contemporary approaches in social and cultural anthropology. These approaches, admittedly, are many and pressed so rarely. Similar arguments can be made on the basis of observed failures of chimpanzees (e.g., Goodall varied, as indeed are the approaches to be found in the current literatures of biology and psychology. Fortu-1986: 426; Kitahara-Frisch and Norikoshi 1982) or other free-living primates (see Tomasello and Call 1997: 282-nately, not all biologists are committed to a reductionist view of the organism as a vehicle for the propagation 84 for review) to imitate adaptive behaviors after watching others repeatedly exhibit them.
of form-and-behaviour-specifying information, nor are all psychologists committed to what could be called the We know of nothing that wild chimpanzees do that an individual chimpanzee could not learn for itself Xerox model of behaviour, according to which every exemplar of a traditional practice is run off from a master (Goodall 1970). We can, therefore, tentatively conclude that in the millions of years that Pan troglodytes has copy installed within the mind of the individual.
These, nevertheless, are the theoretical commitexisted, chimpanzees have not ratcheted any behavior to a level where the cumulative effects of culture are ments that Boesch and Tomasello bring to their work.
And if there is a fundamental and intractable dichotobvious. By contrast, I suspect that one would not have to observe even the most technologically or socially omy, it is between the kind of approach they adopt, with its emphasis on the distribution and transmission primitive of human social groups for 30 hours, never mind 30 years, to see examples of behavior that were of information, and more developmentally and ecologically oriented approaches in biology and psychology obviously the product of cumulative culture.
In summary, it is not my position that chimpanzees (e.g., Oyama 1985, Dent-Read and Zukow-Goldring 1997) which ground the activities of organisms in an ondo not actively teach, imitate, or exhibit cumulative cultural change homologous to human culture. Perhaps going and mutually constitutive engagement with their environments. These latter approaches chime with they do. However, ''culture,'' like ''adaptation,'' is an onerous concept (Williams 1966) . The burden of proof much recent work in anthropology which has stressed the inseparability of knowledge and practice and the lies with those who would argue for the existence of human-like culture in any nonhuman species. I do not embodied character of cultural skills (e.g., Bourdieu 1990 , Csordas 1990 , Lave 1990 , Lave and Wenger 1991 . believe that proof has yet been provided.
They also resonate with the position I have taken in my own work (Ingold 1996a, b) . In comparing the ways in which human beings and t im in g o ld Department of Social Anthropology, University of chimpanzees learn, the important thing, according to Boesch and Tomasello, is whether novices realise from Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, England (Tim.Ingold@man.ac.uk) . 30 iv 98 watching others that a certain operation is possible but are left to their own devices to figure out how to do it or whether they precisely copy the bodily routines of It is certainly true, as Boesch and Tomasello remark, that the several disciplines involved with the phenom-their mentors so that the technique is literally reproduced across generations. Depending on the answer, ena of culture approach them with very different concerns and that this puts formidable obstacles in the way Boesch and Tomasello would describe the learning situation as one of either emulation or imitation. For them of interdisciplinary synthesis. The basic dichotomy, they say, is between biological approaches, which fo-the distinction is absolutely critical, for only in the latter case can one speak of the transmission of technique, cus on culture as a corpus of information transmitted by other-than-genetic means, and psychological ap-and only if it is transmitted can the technique form part of a cultural tradition. proaches, which focus on the mechanisms of transmis-ently on the basis of armchair reassessment by a scien-daily life [Hewlett and Cavalli-Sforza 1986] ). Cultural primatology still has a long way to go! tist who has never studied the species (Galef 1992). This rings a bit hollow, given the decades of data on the rise and spread of sweet potato washing and wheat sluicing on Koshima Island, Japan. Three times in their article j ame s d. pa t erson Department of Anthropology, University of Calgary, the authors comment on the slow acquisition and dissemination of these behavioral patterns, but they never Calgary, Alberta, Canada TZN IN4. 13 iv 98 present comparable data from any other wild population of any other species for comparison. One is thus Although evolutionary concepts made their way into physical anthropology by the 1940s and ''the New Physcompelled to ask, Slow relative to what?
Ratcheting. Japanese macaques are also relevant to ical Anthropology'' was declaimed by Washburn in 1951, it has often seemed that the very concept of ''evoanother key characteristic of cultural evolution, the ratchet effect. Thirty years of data on chimpanzees may lution'' is either rejected or distorted in the main field of anthropology. Thus it is indeed pleasant to see some be too few, but 50 years of data (as of 1998) from Koshima are enough. Initial sweet potato washing, in-form of evolutionary concept applied to the culture conundrum. It would have been even better, for the biovented in 1953, had been elaborated into eight variations on the basic theme by 1983. Basic wheat sluicing logically trained or oriented, if the authors had made it clear early in their paper which definition of ''evolubegan in 1958 but had amplified to three types by 1962, six types by 1975, and eight types by 1983 (Kawai, Wata-tion'' they were using. They, in fact, use the simplest definition, ''change over time,'' rather than the more nabe, and Mori 1992). This ''accumulation of modifications over generations in the direction of greater com-common biological definition ''change in gene frequencies over time.'' Perhaps they are implicitly making use plexity'' is impressive evidence of dynamic culture that will not be appreciated unless longitudinal (e.g., Wata-of Dawkins's ''meme'' model and implying ''change in meme frequencies over time'' without actually mennabe 1994) and not just classical descriptive studies (e.g., Kawai 1965, Kawamura 1959) are noted.
tioning it. This should have been set out at the beginning, combined with a disavowal of the erroneously laSign language. The authors discuss decades of research on manual sign language in apes with one sen-beled ''social Darwinism'' of the early 20th century.
I also find it unfortunate that the requirements for tence and one outdated reference (Fouts 1972) . Missing are citations to studies of an immature chimpanzee discussing ''cultural evolution'' involve increases in terminology parallel to that of biological evolution, inherlearning American Sign Language only from other chimpanzees and not from humans (Fouts, Fouts, and ently increasing confusion. It also seems to be necessary to examine and evaluate factors of ''culture'' for chimVan Cantfort 1989) and chimpanzees in sign language conversations among themselves, both with (Fouts, panzees rigorously while for humans the same factors are automatically assumed to be culturally based. Fouts, and Schoenfeld 1984) and without (Fouts 1994) humans present. It is hard to understand why this corThe social models proposed are an ingenious factorization of the process of cultural acquisition, but the depus of research is ignored when 14 other quantitative studies of captive apes are included (e.g., Tomasello and gree of overlap between the various affinity models makes a clear perception of the cultural distribution Camaioni 1997).
Cultural drift. The authors present cultural (tradi-patterns needed to evaluate them extremely difficult. Since some of the models parallel the concept of ''drift'' tional) change over time in adaptation to changed conditions as ''drift.'' This is confusing, as it is analogous in genetic selection, why not reorder the factors into a parallel construct displaying the features of evolutionneither to genetic drift (Wright 1945) nor to tradition or mimetic drift (Burton and Bick 1972) . Both of these arily stable strategies à la Maynard Smith? Or are these not the equivalent of contesting pairs or triads of geneanalogous phenomena refer to random (not selective) effects on traits, especially in the case of small founder controlled behaviours?
It seems as though the appropriate ''selectional mechpopulations.
Human cultural processes. A pervasive theme anism'' is being perceived as a conscious choice rather than an unconscious ''acquisition'' constrained by a set throughout the article is that human societies, unlike nonhuman ones, rely mainly on imitation or linguisti-of environmental and social factors. In many if not most experiential frames, this ''choice'' is a Hobson's choice cally based teaching for cultural transmission. It is said to be ''characteristic of all human cultures [that] they in that there are only two alternatives-accept or reject the one cultural option available. This may be a strong instruct their youngsters in at least some important cultural activities.'' In contrast, chimpanzees but not hu-contender for an equivalent of stabilizing selection (the main result of natural selection), but it leaves us with mans are said in some cases to have traditions based only on individual and not social learning. Thus, the di-the problem of how cultural innovation arises.
A quibble arises from the data presented on ant dipchotomy is framed, but no evidence is presented. In fact, according to the ethnographic record, much ping. The numbers suggest that at Taï the chimpanzees collect about 1.5 ants per centimetre of tool, while at (most?) of what humans learn is acquired passively, without tuition (e.g., the 50 basic skills of Aka pygmy Gombe they could collect nearly 9 per centimetre. Do have a tendency to converge on patterns they witness not an exclusively human phenomenon but an evolutionarily adaptive strategy used by many nonhuman even after experimenting with alternatives. This seems much more akin to humans' tendency to adopt conven-species, most notably chimpanzees. Second, from both a biological and a psychological perspective, the cultions ''just because that is the way others do them'' in preference to individually generated alternatives. If this tures of different animal species (including humans) are not identical but in many cases rely on different prois confirmed and operates in wild chimpanzees, it would provide a powerful canalizing force but one cesses of social transmission, which often gives them different global properties as well (e.g., the way in which is adaptive only in a society in which culture habitually provides many of the best ways of achieving which they evolve over historical time). As McGrew says, cultural primatology has a long way to go. From important outcomes.
our perspective, however, this is not because some people have their definitions wrong but because characterizing all of the different cultures and cultural processes found in different primate species will require much Reply empirical work, both in the field and in the laboratory, as well as theoretical discussion aimed at clarifying operational definitions. c h ri st ophe bo esc h an d mi cha el t om ase l lo Our account of human culture, as one variant of primate culture, was that it includes some processes of Leipzig, Germany. 30 vi 98 transmission, either unique to the species or occurring with greater frequency in humans, that make possible Culture is a notion to which different meanings may be attached depending upon personal conviction and disci-the accumulation of modifications over time in a way or at least to a degree that is not found in other species plinary allegiance. Our attempt to bridge the gap between the views of culture typical in the disciplines of (the ratchet effect). There are two basic criticisms of this proposal. The first (voiced in one way or another by biology and psychology and to find some common ground between them was therefore destined to be Patterson, McGrew, and Whiten) is that we are overestimating human cultural evolution, as cultural traditions greeted with some skepticism-and indeed it has been. For one commentator, we are much too generous in at-in many cultures stay the same, or nearly the same, for vast stretches of historical time. We agree that this is tributing culture to chimpanzees (Galef), whereas for another we underappreciate the cultural abilities of an empirical fact and that human cultures vary widely in the degree to which they tolerate or even encourage both macaques and chimpanzees (McGrew) . From a modern cultural-anthropological point of view, we are changes in traditions. But we think that the rapid accumulation of modifications to traditions in some cultoo reductionist in talking of culture as processes of ''transmission'' (Ingold), whereas from a more biological tures-and the likely fact that all cultures are able to accumulate modifications relatively rapidly under cerpoint of view we complicate things unnecessarily by distinguishing cognitive processes that really amount tain conditions-argues that this is not a limitation in some conservative cultures' abilities to make and accuto the same thing (Byrne). These comments thus reflect the state of the field, in which some suggest culture in mulate modifications to traditions but rather an active choice not to make such changes, one example of what birds and insects (Bonner 1980) while others think that culture is possible only in a species with language.
we called ''social constraints.'' The second criticism (voiced mainly by Whiten and In our opinion, any attempt to find common ground between disciplines will be criticized in this way, since Byrne) is that perhaps we are too quick to conclude that nonhuman primates do not have traditions that have each tradition of thinking has its own good reasons for defining things as it does. Common ground is possible accumulated modifications over time and, in any case, the connection of the ratchet effect exclusively to imionly with risk taking, compromise, and conciliation on all sides. Scientific definitions are not the same thing as tative learning is not a necessary one. We should say first of all that we did not mean to exclude the possibilscientific facts, however. They are made to be broken as different scientists with different views propose al-ity of the ratchet effect in chimpanzee cultural traditions; rather, we meant to suggest that it would occur ternative perspectives, and encouraging this kind of discussion was in fact our main aim in addressing the arti-only infrequently and with much difficulty because the social learning processes on which it depends (imitative cle to as wide an audience as possible. Our article is criticized from both sides, indeed from several sides, learning and perhaps teaching) either are less widely present in chimpanzee than in human populations or and we take this as an indication that we have succeeded, at least to some extent, in finding a place near individual chimpanzees use them only infrequently.
Under such circumstances, the ratchet will not work the middle of the fray. From this middle place, in which we view culture as a complex and variegated set of so-very well, and so there will be much ''slippage'' across generations. It is also possible that chimpanzees are cial transmission processes, we have made two basic points which we think are incontrovertible. First, from more capable of accumulating modifications in traditions than we currently suspect but that various social this relatively broad biological perspective, culture is constraints prevent them from making changes to any vant and what is irrelevant in the behavior is manifest-even if they do not come to the observational sitestablished behavioral competency without very good reason.
uation with the same goal in mind. Thus, recent research has shown that human children selectively reThe connection of the ratchet effect to a particular form of social learning, imitative learning, is a difficult produce the intentional but not the accidental actions of adults even when both actions lead to the same end issue, but perhaps we may clarify it by focusing on Whiten's main example. This example concerns the in-result (Carpenter, Akhtar, and Tomasello n.d.), produce a result that an adult intended but did not actually provention, by one individual chimpanzee in Bossou, of a meta-tool: stabilizing a lopsided nut-cracking rock-duce (Meltzoff 1995), and learn linguistic symbols whose conventional association with their communicaanvil by placing a smaller rock under one side of it. Presumably this individual could only have invented this tive functions requires that they be copied relatively faithfully from the behavior of others (Tomasello n.d.). meta-tool once he had learned to use the normal nutcracking tool. But creative inventions-as fascinating Learners who understand the demonstrator's goals thus have a principled basis for deciding which behaviors and as they are in their own right-are only half the story in cumulative cultural evolution. The other half is that changes of state in the environment are important to reproduce and which may be safely ignored-again, other individuals in the group then socially learn this new tool-use strategy from the inventor-and indeed it even when the goals of inventor and learner are initially different. Imitative learning thus provides a much wider is only this second half of the process that is properly called the ratchet (keeping the invention active in the range of situations than emulation learning in which learners will faithfully reproduce the intentional acgroup until some new invention that builds on it comes along). To our knowledge this brilliant new meta-tool tions of others and so create a ratchet effect over time.
To conclude, we thank the commentators for taking has not found widespread use among individuals at Bossou, and so it is an example of individual invention not the time to think about these issues in a public forum.
Multidisciplinary discussions are always difficult and social learning or the ratchet effect per se.
What would it take for this invention to accumulate may not always bear fruit when foundational assumptions are extremely dissonant. In this case, however, modifications over time? Our contention is that while emulation learning might work under some circum-there seems to be enough common ground concerning processes of culture and cultural evolution that investistances, it is much less likely to work than imitative learning. The reason is this: In emulation learning gators from many different disciplines can begin to make their voices heard in a way that results in an acculearners do not really know what the inventor is doing from an intentional point of view. If the inventor moves mulation of modifications to the concept of culture that will facilitate everyone's empirical work. debris out from under the anvil, learners cannot know if this is relevant or irrelevant to the goal because, by definition, they do not know what the goal is. They do not know if first placing one small rock under the anvil, then moving it, and then placing another one is a probReferences Cited lem-solving sequence or a just a random sequence because, again, by definition, they do not understand the a l e x a n d e r, r. only conceivably produce a ratchet effect when objects b o e s c h. c. , p. m a r c h e s i, n. m a r c h e s i, b. f r u t h, are involved; it cannot work for things like gestural a n d f. j o u l i a n. 1994. 
